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Abstract
Many times in mathematics there is a natural dichotomy between
describing some object from the inside and from the outside. Imagine
algebraic varieties for instance; they can be described from the out-
side as solution sets of polynomial equations, but one can also try to
understand how it is for actual points to move around inside them,
perhaps to parameterize them in some way. The concept of formal
proofs has the interesting feature that it provides opportunities for
both perspectives. The inner perspective has been largely overlooked.
A principal observation of this paper is that mathematical struc-
tures can be embedded into spaces of logical formulas and inherit
additional structure from proofs. We shall look at nitely generated
groups, rational numbers and SL(2;Z), and examples from topology
and analysis.
One of the main themes of this paper will be the possibility to embed
mathematical structures into the space of logical formulas through a notion
of feasibility. The combinatorics of proofs can then induce new structures on
the original mathematical objects. We shall often see how the existence of
short proofs reects the structure of the underlying object, especially internal
symmetry that is susceptible to dynamical processes.
We shall discuss these ideas for nitely generated groups. This will induce
a new geometry, dierent from the one coming from the word metric. Already
for free groups we shall see that the new structure is quite involved.
We shall consider rational numbers, where the logical notion of feasibility
will be illustrated through the action of SL(2;Z) on Q by projective trans-
formations. This approach to the complexity of rational numbers suggests
relationships between the lengths of proofs and number-theoretic properties.
We shall consider well-known constructions in topology. In spirit these
constructions are compatible with the idea of feasibility. We shall describe
an example of a torus bundle in which there is exponential distortion induced
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by a simple cycling which is similar to the cycling and substitutions that can
occur within proofs. We shall also look at ordinary dierential equations and
exponentiation with continuous parameters.
We begin with primitive questions about the way in which mathematical
objects are described, in mathematics in general and logic in particular.
1 Inner and outer descriptions
What is a set? How can a set be described? These are basic questions which
reverberate in mathematics down to the foundations. Let us consider them
here in the practical way of what mathematicians actually do.
There is a basic distinction between what one might call inner and outer
descriptions of sets. For an outer description one might have a given set
A embedded into some larger space X of simple structure, and one may
describe A by specifying rules which determine which elements of X are in
A. An inner description might provide a listing of the elements of A, with
more concern for the internal structure of A than an embedding of it into a
larger space.
Let us consider an example. How can we describe a curve   in the plane?
One answer might be to provide a parameterization of it, (x(t); y(t)), t 2 R.
Another possibility is to dene   as the set of solutions to some equation,
  = f(x; y) 2 R
2
: F (x; y) = 0g;
where F (x; y) is some function.
These are very dierent ways to describe a curve. In the rst case it
might be easy to generate many points on the curve without having a general
understanding or test for when a point lies on it. For inner descriptions it
may not be clear how many points are needed to have a reasonably accurate
picture of the set in question, and one may have to be careful about exploring
well one part while missing another. In the second case one might have a
simple characterization of the elements of the set without a clear idea of how
to nd actual solutions.
Consider the case where we dene   as the zero set of F (x; y) with F
a polynomial. A basic point about the algebraic notion of a plane curve is
that it may not be compatible with the notion of a parameterization. Over
the real numbers the zero set might be empty, or have several components,
including compact components, etc. Some of these problems can be alleviated
by working with complex numbers and making assumptions of irreducibility.
A more interesting incompatibility with the idea of a parameterization is that
the curve might not be rational, so that it may not be reasonable to try to
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parameterize the curve with the ground eld. It might be an elliptic curve
or a curve of higher genus. (See [29] for a discussion of algebraic curves.)
If we work over a eld like the rational numbers there might be more basic
problems about the existence of points on the curve. (Someone once pointed
out to us that a great idea in algebraic geometry is that one can study sets
of equations independently of whether one knows that there are solutions.)
Instead of thinking algebraically we can think more in terms of calculus.
We should be careful about what kind of functions we allow. For instance,
any closed subset of the plane can be realized as the zero set of a C
1
function
F . (Take F (x; y) = exp((x; y)
 1
), (x; y) as on p171 of [44].) Thus the
C
1
property is too exible by itself to provide a practical way to describe
sets. We can avoid this problem by restricting ourselves to smooth functions
F whose gradient rF does not vanish on the zero set of F . This is the
hypothesis of the implicit function theorem, which then implies that the
zero set of F is locally given by a smooth curve. One can have singularities
at critical points, as in the case of polynomials, and there is a theory for
analyzing these.
This is a very basic example which hopefully illustrates well what we have
in mind by \inner" and \outer" descriptions. We also see how the context
matters. It is very dierent to think algebraically in terms of polynomials
than in terms of smooth functions. Calculus permits a more exible idea of
function for which it is easier to deal with the notion of tangents naively, while
algebra is more rigid but enjoys more exibility of context, in that one can
switch to the rationals or other ground elds. In algebra the singularities can
be awkward to manage but their complexity is controlled at least in principle,
while calculus tolerates nearly arbitrary behavior through innite processes.
If we want to make an inner description by listing points, this listing
should respect the structure of the situation, like smoothness or algebraic
properties. In topology one would impose continuity conditions on mappings,
in geometry and analysis one might require that mappings do not distort
distances too severely.
These ideas show up in many dierent contexts in mathematics. For
instance one can take some nite set A as an alphabet and look at the set
A

of all words generated by elements of A, i.e., all nite strings of elements
of A. One might have a language L based on A, which is to say a subset
of A

. A priori L could be anything. How might it be described? L might
be eectively enumerable, so that there is an algorithm for generating all of
its elements. This is a kind of inner description. Instead there might be an
outer description, like an algorithm that says when a word lies in L.
Roughly speaking, inner descriptions correspond to ways to produce the
eective witness, while outer descriptions correspond to ways to check mem-
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bership and to decide yes/no questions.
If one knows that L is pretty \thick" { i.e., one has reasonably large
lower bounds on the number of elements of L among the words of length n
{ then one might be able to get a practical way to list the elements of L
from the algorithm for deciding whether a word lies in L or not. One simply
goes through all the words and keeps the elements of L. This need not work
very well if L is too sparse. In the case of integer solutions of a polynomial
equation F (x; y) = 0 it may be very dicult to tell if there are any solutions
(Hilbert's tenth problem) or to know how many. In general the existence of
integer solutions of polynomial equations is algorithmically undecidable, but
this is not known for the rationals or other elds.
Conversely, there are sets which are eectively enumerable but for which
there is no algorithm to decide membership.
There are nice variations on this theme of thickness and sparseness of
languages in the context of the P = NP problem. See [28], p.87.
As another example suppose that we have an n  n matrix of complex
numbers, which we think of as dening a linear mapping T onC
n
. A complex
number  is an eigenvalue of T if I T is not invertible as a linear mapping
on C
n
. The set of eigenvalues is called the spectrum of T . One can dene it
more concretely as the set of zeros of the polynomial equation
det(I   T ) = 0:
This is a perfectly good denition of the spectrum, but how does one actually
nd eigenvalues? This is a tricky question whose numerical solution is of great
importance and much studied.
Dynamical systems provide another interesting case to consider. One
might be able to generate a good approximation to an attractor quickly from
the inside, looking at iterates of a critical point for instance, while the \rules"
which govern the geometry of the attractor might be hard to see. The number
of points needed to have an accurate picture of the attractor might be unclear
as well.
Inner and outer descriptions need not be very compatible with each other.
In mathematics one is often much more accessible than the other. Which one
is more accessible depends on the context.
In the next section we shall discuss the particular case of the set of all
tautologies inside the space of formulas. In Section 3 we discuss how individ-
ual formulas can in turn be used to describe subsets of other sets (equipped
with some structure), and in Section 4 we consider the general relationship
between algebraic structures and points inside a set.
In Section 5 we take up the notion of feasibility. This provides a way
for us to embed a mathematical structure inside the space of formulas (with
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respect to some language). The combinatorics of formal proofs then induces
new structure on our original mathematical object. For this the cut rule is
particularly relevant. This idea is developed through examples in Sections
5-10.
This paper is intended to be accessible to a broad audience. Readers not
very familiar with formal proofs may nd [10] a useful source of background
material.
2 The set of tautologies
The set of tautologies provides an interesting case to consider for inner and
outer descriptions. One can consider either propositional or predicate logic.
Imagine xing a collection of variables and the rest of a logical language,
so that one has specied a notion of formulas. Let us think of the set of all
formulas as being relatively simple (e.g., a recursive set), and imagine that
we are interested in understanding the set of all tautologies as a subset of it
through both inner and outer descriptions.
For an inner description of the space of all tautologies we can use proofs.
The rules for building proofs provide a way to move around in the space. It
may not be easy to reach a particular tautology, but in principle we can go
anywhere in the space through proofs.
Given two tautologies we can always make a new one through binary
logical rules. As we wander around in the space we may very well return
back to the same tautology over and over again. The structure of the possible
ways to move within the space reects its geometry.
The idea of the relationship between the geometry of a space and the
ability to move around in it is much studied in other parts of mathematics.
What about outer descriptions? We can use semantics to provide a kind
of outer description of tautologies. The completeness theorem says that
the set of provable formulas is the same as the set of formulas which are
\true" under all interpretations. We can think of each interpretation as a
test. Although there are many such tests (and indeed the set of predicate
tautologies is algorithmically undecidable), it is remarkable nonetheless that
tautologies enjoy these outer and inner descriptions simultaneously. One can
argue that it is reasonable that neither description is very simple given that
we are lucky enough to have both.
In the case of propositional logic some of these issues emerge more clearly.
The \outer" characterization of tautologies as being the formulas which are
true in every interpretation implies that the set of tautologies is co-NP. If
P = NP (and hence P = co-NP) then there is a polynomial-time algorithm
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which tells whether a propositional formula is a tautology. This would be a
very eective outer description.
It is not known exactly how the size of a tautology is related to the size
of its shortest proof. The existence of short proofs is a way to say that the
inner description of propositional tautologies through proofs is ecient.
Propositional and predicate logic provide very basic examples of sets in
mathematics whose descriptions one would like to understand better. An-
other interesting example is provided by Brouwer's intuitionistic logic. In
this system disjunctions and existential quantiers are treated dierently
from classical logic, so that one cannot assert A_B without actually having
a proof of one of A or B. In particular one does not take A _ :A as being
automatic. The structure of proofs is somewhat simpler in this case than
in classical logic, but the correct notion of interpretations for characterizing
tautologies is more complicated.
We should mention that this is the same Brouwer who proved the famous
xed-point theorem.
Logical formulas themselves can describe mathematical objects. Our abil-
ity to describe the set of formulas is tied to the way that individual formulas
can speak about underlying objects. The existence of short proofs leads to
an ecient inner description of the set of all tautologies. A proof of a for-
mula can reect the structure of the underlying objects. Intuitionistic and
classical logic dier both in the way that they describe mathematical objects
and in the way that their sets of tautologies are described. For Brouwer a
proof is a kind of function, where a rule like Modus Ponens corresponds to
composition of functions. This is connected to the theory of Lambda Calcu-
lus, which associates functions to intuitionistic proofs in a way that reects
their internal structure.
3 Describing sets through logical formulas
Mathematical logic provides interesting ways to make descriptions of sets.
The most basic method comes from the model theory for rst-order logic.
The reader who is not familiar with these concepts need not lose heart, we
simply want to have an impression in mind.
In logic one has a language for talking about structures and about dening
special subsets of a given set abstractly, independently of any specic set.
Before we say what this means in general let us think about groups. There is
an abstract idea of groups that exists independently of any particular group.
There is also a way to talk about certain subsets of a group, like the elements
of a certain order, or the center of the group, that exists independently of
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any particular group.
The idea of abstract mathematical structures can be formalized through
a logical language. In a rst-order language one has the usual logical con-
nectives which represent \and", \or", \not", \implies", and the quantiers
\for all" and \there exists", but one has additional symbols which reect the
particular structure. One allows variables, constants, function symbols, and
predicates (relations). Each function symbol and predicate has a xed num-
ber of arguments, called the arity. The number and the arities of the function
symbols and relations may depend on the given mathematical structure.
For example, for the theory of groups one uses one relation, the binary
relation of equality =. There are two function symbols, one binary and one
unary, which correspond to group multiplication and inversion. There is one
constant symbol, corresponding to the identity element of the group.
These are all just symbols however, there is no underlying set. That is
because a rst-order language intends to describe the idea of a group rather
than a particular one.
One also needs the notion of a term, which is an expression constructed
from variables and constants using function symbols. Think of a formal
expression for groups, some product of variables, possibly with inverses. The
functions and relations take terms for their arguments, as in the composition
s
 1
t and the relation s = t in the context of groups, where s and t are terms.
A relation with a choice of arguments { like s = t { is a logical formula in
a rst-order language, an atomic formula. Informally it is a statement which
might be true or false, depending on the context. These atomic formulas can
be combined with the logical connectives to build more complicated formulas.
The theory of groups consists of the usual axioms governing the group
operations, such as the associativity axiom.
All of this exists purely at the level of formal symbols. Roughly speaking
a model is a specic interpretation of the constants, functions, and relations
over some set. This means a set S in which the variables can take values,
with particular choices in the set for constant symbols and particular choices
for the functions and relations. These choices should satisfy the axioms of the
theory. Thus actual groups are models for the rst-order theory of groups,
with an actual set of group elements, the usual notion of equality, a choice
of group operations, etc. There are many dierent kinds of groups, many
dierent models, but just one rst-order theory of groups.
Another example is provided by arithmetic. One can formalize it with the
binary relations = and <, operations like addition and multiplication, and
the well-known Peano axioms. The usual notion of natural numbers provides
a model for this theory, but there are nonstandard models too.
A rst-order language provides the possibility to make universal recipes
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for describing certain sets, a set for each choice of model. A formula in the
language, like (x; y; z), with the free variables x, y, and z and no others,
denes such a recipe. Given a specic model based on a set S we can get a
subset of S  S  S, namely the set of triples (x; y; z) for which (x; y; z) is
a valid formula. For instance one can dene the center of the group in this
way, or the set of elements of order 2. In the theory of elds one can dene
algebraic varieties without specifying the particular ground eld. For ordered
elds one can dene sets in terms of polynomial equations and inequalities.
One can think of this as a way to make \outer" descriptions of certain
classes of sets through logic. It is rather sophisticated, because of the possi-
bility of quantiers. Without quantiers it is already subtle, a kind of tricky
extension of algebra, but quantiers make it even more complicated. Indeed,
many problems of decidability involve nding a uniform way to eliminate
quantiers.
These are well-known and much studied ideas, particularly in connection
with algebraic sets and their generalizations. However the model-theoretic
view does not seem to provide good ways to explore sets from the inside.
4 Some comments about algebra and points
The preceding discussion is reminiscent of a general phenomenon in algebra,
in which one has algebraic structures which make sense abstractly but which
arise classically from actual sets with actual points. A basic example of this
is given by the following. Let X be a compact Hausdor topological space,
and let C(X) denote the space of all complex-valued continuous functions on
X. This is an algebra, and even a C

-algebra. However one can talk about
algebras abstractly even if they do not arise from actual spaces in this way.
We would like to say that having a theory (in the sense of logic) is like
having an algebra without necessarily having a space of points underneath.
One can have representations of the algebra on spaces with actual points, as
in the notion of a structure in model theory.
The idea of \inner descriptions" should entail actual points in actual
spaces and their interactions. To what extent can we do that directly from
the algebraic structure? For this question the example of abstract algebras
and algebras of functions is instructive.
IfX and C(X) are as above, then we can recover the points in X from the
algebraic structure in C(X). If p is a point inX, then ff 2 C(X) : f(p) = 0g
is a maximal ideal in C(X), and conversely every maximal ideal arises in this
manner. Given another compact Hausdor space Y one can show that X is
homeomorphic to Y if and only if C(X) is isomorphic to C(Y ) as an algebra.
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One can characterize the algebras that arise this way, as commutative C

-
algebras. See [38, 40]. There are analogous stories in the context of algebraic
varieties, but let us stick to topological spaces for simplicity.
In principle compact Hausdor spaces are described completely by the
algebra of commutative functions on them, but how does this work prac-
tically? How can one see inside the space through the algebra? In some
kind of practical way, and not just in principle? This turns out to be very
mysterious, and not much is known. There is a dierent way to try to rep-
resent the structure of a space in purely algebraic terms, through which one
can recover topological invariants of the underlying space from direct alge-
braic constructions. See [13]. This approach also gives meaning to these
topological invariants in non-commutative settings where there need not be
\points" in the classical sense, and this is a matter of great current interest
in mathematical physics.
This is similar in spirit to the relationship between operational and de-
notational semantics in programming languages. See [47].
It can happen naturally that one has an algebra in hand but not the
underlying points that one wants. For example, let T be a linear transfor-
mation acting on some C
n
. Consider the algebra of linear transformations
generated by T , which amounts to saying all polynomials in T . This is a nice
commutative algebra, but what are the underlying \points"?
Suppose that T is diagonal and has distinct eigenvalues 
1
; : : : ; 
n
2 C.
These eigenvalues are the \points" in a natural way. If we let X denote
the set of them, then the algebra of linear transformations generated by
T is isomorphic to the algebra of polynomials restricted to the set X =
f
1
; : : : ; 
n
g  C of eigenvalues.
If T is not diagonal but is diagonalizable then the algebra which it gener-
ates has the same form. If it is not diagonalizable, having a nontrivial Jordan
canonical form, then the notion of \points" underlying the algebra is more
problematic, because of nilpotent elements.
There are versions of this discussion for linear operators acting on innite-
dimensional spaces, in which the natural notion of spectrum is an innite set
whose topological structure becomes important. See [38]. This brings us
closer to the earlier discussion.
A better analogy between logical theories and algebraic structures in
which the concept of \points" is not directly involved is provided by Boolean
algebras. In the Boolean case the elements of the algebra are closer to points
in an underlying set (in the sense of Stone's theorem) than for algebras of
complex-valued functions.
In proofs the algebraic structure is coded through rules of inference. It
is also natural to think of proofs simultaneously as being sets with points
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(such as atomic formulas) and combinatorial structure. This is a remarkable
coexistence.
This idea is illustrated in a strong way by [6], in which the Craig in-
terpolation theorem [15] is discussed in a combinatorial context without the
algebraic structure of connectives. This combinatorial view of points in a
proof is also present in the notion of logical ow graphs [5, 7], which trace the
logical connections within a proof, and in the study of cycles in these graphs,
as in [7, 8, 9]. (Logical ow graphs are related to the earlier notion of proof
nets [20].) The concept of inner proofs from [7] reects the idea that there
are points walking around inside proofs.
We shall give here other examples to illustrate this idea of proofs dealing
with physical points and not just algebraic constructions. One of the tools
for doing this will be the notion of feasibility, which arose from an extension
of arithmetic that we shall discuss next.
5 Feasible numbers
There has been much concern in mathematics about abstraction which may
not reect anything concrete or \real". Extremely large numbers were trou-
bling to some, and there was the idea that they should be treated dierently
from a small number like 37 which is closer to ordinary existence.
The rst mathematical treatment of feasible numbers was given in [36].
(The philosophical discussions go back to Mannoury, Poincare, and Wittgen-
stein.) For this we start with the rst-order theory of arithmetic, and we add
a unary predicate F . Roughly speaking F (x) is interpreted as meaning that
x can be constructed in some feasible manner. We shall use the arithmetic
operations +,  (multiplication), and s (successor). In addition to the usual
axioms of arithmetic we add the following axioms for F :
F (0)
F : equality x = y ! (F (x)! F (y))
F : successor F (x)! F (s(x))
F : plus F (x) ^ F (y)! F (x+ y)
F : times F (x) ^ F (y)! F (x  y)
In other words, 0 is considered to be feasible, and the property of feasibility
is closed under equality, successor, addition, and multiplication.
For this discussion we do not permit ourselves to use induction over F -
formulas. Otherwise we could prove 8xF (x) in a few steps. Note that if we
add the axiom 9x:F (x), asserting the existence of a nonfeasible number,
then we still get a consistent system, for which the models are nonstandard
models of arithmetic.
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The idea instead is that if we can write down a proof of F (t) for some
term t, then that should mean that t was \feasible" in a reasonable sense. Of
course we can always prove F (n) for any natural number n in about n steps,
using the successor rule repeatedly. (Strictly speaking we are abusing the
rst-order language of arithmetic here, n really means the result of applying
n times the successor function to 0. Syntactic technicalities only detract from
the main points and we shall ignore them without remorse.) However we can
use the size of a proof of F (n) as a measurement of the feasibility of n.
This is a very nice point. We can use proofs to make descriptions of
mathematical objects and to make measurements of their complexity. We
shall push aside the foundational issues and simply use the idea of feasibility
as a tool for studying mathematical structures.
To make precise the measurements one should be careful about the for-
malization of proofs. We shall not discuss this in detail, but there are a couple
of important points. The rst is that we consider only proofs in which the
result of any intermediate step is used only once. Thus proofs have tree-like
structures. The second concerns the role of the \cut" rule in sequent calculus
and its counterpart in other systems. Roughly speaking, the cut rule allows
indirect reasoning through lemmas. It is a generalization of the deduction
rule Modus Ponens, which says that if you know A and if you know that A
implies B then you can conclude B. Without the cut rule a proof of F (t)
for some term t would have to exhibit an explicit construction of the term
t. With the cut rule one can make short proofs of feasibility which provide
only implicit descriptions, as we shall soon see. There are eective meth-
ods for converting proofs with cuts into proofs without, at the cost of great
expansion in the proofs. See [21, 45, 10].
Let us mention one more point. In [36] an F : inequality rule is included
in the axioms, to the eect that if y is feasible and x < y then x is also
feasible. For the historical concern about large numbers this is a reasonable
requirement to consider, but we have omitted it intentionally. It does not t
as well with the idea of a proof of feasibility of F (t) as providing a description
of t, and it is less convenient for other mathematical contexts. So we simply
drop it. This is an important conceptual point. In mathematics we can make
denitions to suit our purposes, irrespective of historical traditions.
So let us now consider the concrete matter of how we might give short
proofs of feasibility of numbers. We follow the examples in [8].
We can always get a proof of F (n) in about n lines through repeated use
of the F : successor rule. We can be a little more intelligent and get a proof
of F (2
n
) in about n lines using the F : times rule repeatedly. This is the
standard mathematician's trick of using geometric progressions.
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We can improve on this as follows. We know that
F (x)! F (x
2
)(1)
In particular we have that
F (2
2
j
)! F (2
2
j+1
)(2)
for all j = 0; 1; 2; : : : We can combine n   1 copies of (2) together with the
feasibility of 2 (i.e., F (s(s(0)))) to get a proof of F (2
2
n
) in O(n) lines.
In this argument we won an exponential over the previous one. The price
for this was that we were implicitly using cuts and contractions to make
the building blocks and to combine them. The proof of feasibility did not
furnish a direct construction. In terms of sequent calculus one can see the
importance of the contractions. To prove F (x) ! F (x
2
) one contracts two
copies of F (x) on the left-hand side of the sequent into one.
We can win another exponential using quantiers. We can prove the
feasibility of 2
2
2
n
in O(n) lines. The proof is constructed from the following
building blocks. First we have that 2 is feasible, as above. Next we have that
8x(F (x)! F (x
2
));(3)
which was the main ingredient in the preceding construction. The last build-
ing block is
8x(F (x)! F (x
k
))! 8x(F (x)! F (x
k
2
))(4)
That is, we can use 8x(F (x)! F (x
k
)) twice, the second time replacing
x with x
k
, to get 8x(F (x)! F (x
k
2
)). This is much better than before, we
are squaring the exponent instead of multiplying it by 2. By combining a
series of these last building blocks, with k = 2
2
j
, j = 0; 1; : : : ; n   1, we can
conclude that
8x(F (x)! F (x
2
))! 8x(F (x)! F (x
2
2
n
));(5)
and then we combine with the other pieces to get a proof of F (2
2
2
n
) in O(n)
lines.
This last approach has some interesting features. As observed in [8], we
only used the F : times rule once, in the proof of (3). In (4) we made
progress by making a substitution. The proof of (4) uses contraction rules in
an interesting way, one uses 8x(F (x)! F (x
k
)) twice to get F (x) ! F (x
k
)
and F (x
k
) ! F ((x
k
)
k
), but the quantier rules permit us to convert this
12
into two copies of 8x(F (x) ! F (x
k
)) which can then be contracted into
each other. This is a standard point about quantiers and contractions, they
permit us to contract two occurrences of a formula into one even though they
have very dierent histories within the proof. This kind of substitution did
not occur in the previous propositional argument.
Notice that in this last proof we did not have nesting of quantiers. There
are more elaborate proofs, due to Solovay, which use many nested quantiers
to get short proofs of very large numbers dened through towers of exponen-
tials of arbitrary height. One gains an extra exponential with each nested
quantier. See [8] for details and a discussion of the dynamical structure of
these proofs.
With these examples in mind let us think about the type of description
of a number provided by a proof of feasibility. In a proof of F (2
n
) in about n
lines using multiplications we really make an explicit construction. We can-
not expect to do better than win an exponential, because our most powerful
operation is multiplication.
The other arguments are increasingly less explicit, because of the use of
substitutions. There is a kind of balance in this; as the proofs become shorter,
their internal structure becomes correspondingly more complicated, reecting
the increasing diculty by which the implicit descriptions can be unwound
into explicit constructions. The logical ow graphs of the proofs, which trace
the ow of occurrences of formulas in proofs, become more complicated, with
increasing numbers of bridges and cycles. See [8, 9].
The procedure of Cut-elimination (introduced by Gentzen [18, 19], see
[21, 45, 10]) furnishes a general method for transforming implicit descriptions
into explicit constructions with eective bounds.
In giving short proofs of feasibility of large numbers like 2
2
n
or 2
2
2
n
we
are using the special structure of these numbers, a kind of internal symmetry
to them. This internal symmetry is reected in the existence of short proofs,
but there are no theorems about this. In general we should not be able to win
so much compression using cuts, because arbitrary numbers will not have so
much internal symmetry. General quantitative results have not been given.
The mathematical idea of feasibility provides a way to embed arithmetic
inside a space of formulas. Formal proofs then lead to new structure for
natural numbers. This structure is quite dierent from the ones that are
usually considered, and the cut rule plays an important role in this.
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6 Groups
In recent years much attention has been devoted to the study of the structure
in nitely generated groups which can be seen through the word metric. (See
[26], for instance.) One xes a generating set and denes the distance from
an element g of the group G to the identity e to be the minimal length of
the word that represents g. This can be extended to a left-invariant metric
on all of G.
We can try to make other kinds of uniform measurements in the theory
of groups using proofs and the idea of feasibility. Again let us introduce a
unary predicate F , acting now on elements of our given group G. Let us also
x a nite subset S of G { we can think of it as a generating set, but actually
the concept makes sense in any case { and require that F have the following
properties:
F (e)
F () for each  2 S
F : equality x = y ! (F (x)! F (y))
F : composition F (x) ^ F (y)! F (xy)
F : inverse F (x)! F (x
 1
)
Here we write xy for the group composition and x
 1
for the group inverse.
The length of the shortest proof of the feasibility of an element of G can
be taken to be some kind of measurement of its complexity. It is a well-
dened function on G because of the F : equality rule. The length is always
bounded by a constant multiple of the distance to e in the word metric.
We can make examples of proofs of feasibility which parallel the ones in the
previous section. If x 2 G is feasible, then we can make a proof of F (x
n
) in
O(n) lines, by repeated use of the F : composition rule. We can be more
clever and get a proof of F (x
2
n
) in O(n) lines by making proofs of
F (x
2
j
)! F (x
2
j+1
)(6)
for j = 0; 1; 2; : : : ; n 1 as in (2) and combining them. This argument requires
only propositional logical rules. If we use also quantiers then we can get a
proof of F (x
2
2
n
) in O(n) lines as before. That is, the proof that we outlined
before for (4) works just as well here.
The last method that we mentioned in Section 5, based on nesting of
quantiers, does not work in the theory of groups. To apply it to get a
universal nonelementary distortion in groups (i.e, short proofs of F (b) !
F (b
N
) with N a tower of exponentials like 2
2
2
2
2
) we would have to permit
ourselves to quantify over integers as well as group elements. Indeed, for
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this argument we need to make substitutions into exponents, and this means
substitutions with integers. The other arguments require only substitutions
of group elements.
At any rate we can make short proofs of feasibility using the rst two
methods. Given a nitely generated group these methods can be combined
with the cancellation induced by the relations to yield even shorter proofs
of feasibility. For example, let G be the group with generators x and y and
the single relation y
2
= xyx
 1
. Thus y
2
m
= x
m
yx
 m
. The feasibility of x
m
implies that of x
m
yx
 m
, and combining this with the earlier arguments we
can get a proof of the feasibility of the group element y
2
2
2
n
in O(n) lines.
(See [26] for other examples of nitely presented groups with distortion.)
Although in a sense we are simply transferring the earlier arguments
for integers (from Section 5) to the theory of groups, there is an important
dierence between the two situations. In groups there are many ways to go to
innity. In a free group, for instance, every innite word describes a path to
innity in the associated tree. Our arguments about the integers lead to a lot
of compression for proofs of feasibility along the direction of a cyclic subgroup
fa
n
g, at least for some n's. In the word metric all directions towards innity
in the free group are practically the same, but in the geometry of feasibility
the cyclic subgroups are very special compared to generic directions. One
can think of feasibility as providing a way to measure the amount of algebraic
structure in a given direction.
This point can be seen in broader terms. The amount of compression
that one can get for a notion of feasibility in some context can be seen as a
measurement of the internal structure of the object in question. The exam-
ples in Section 5 reect the internal symmetry in the case of arithmetic. We
can form z
x
, where z and x are both integers, and we can make substitutions
between them.
In the spirit of automatic groups (see [16]) one can be interested in rep-
resenting a group through its set of words. We can enhance the notion of
feasibility to be sensitive to the dierent ways that a group element is repre-
sented by words. Suppose now that our group G is nitely presented, with
a nite set R of relations w
i
= e which express the triviality of the words
w
i
. We can introduce a new unary predicate T so that T (w) is intended as
meaning that w represents a trivial word. We impose the following axioms:
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T (e)
T (w
i
) for each w
i
2 R
T : equality w = u! (T (w)! T (u))
T : composition T (w) ^ T (u)! T (wu)
T : inverse T (w)! T (w
 1
)
T : conjugation T (w)! T (vwv
 1
)
The idea of the last rule is that a trivial word conjugated by any word should
again be trivial. It seems reasonable to make this rule without requiring that
v be feasible, but one might want to make dierent choices, depending on
the context.
For the purposes of making measurements in groups, one can combine
the axioms for F and T and also add
F (w); T (u)! F (wu) and F (w); T (u)! F (uw):
Now F is dened over words instead of group elements.
The notions presented in this section are not necessarily canonical or xed.
For instance, one might want to study chains of subgroups, each normal in
the larger one, with dierent predicates for the dierent subgroups, each
predicate axiomatized as above.
The bottom line is that proofs provide a nice way to try to look inside
groups, to move around inside them and test their structure. This is an idea
that has not been explored.
The view of groups and proofs described in this section was motivated
by [9], which goes in the opposite direction: one starts with a proof and
associates a group to it to reect its structure.
One feature of the idea of feasibility is its universality. It applies to all
groups at once, like the word metric. This universality continues to exist
under restrictions on the kind of proofs that we allow. This is an impor-
tant point: one is free to choose a fragment of logic to suit one's purposes.
Dierent fragments can lead to dierent metrics on groups.
7 Rational numbers
We can extend the idea of feasibility to rational numbers in a natural way.
For our purposes it will be convenient to consider 1 as a rational number,
with the conventions that 1  1 = 1, a  1 = 1  a = 1 when a 6= 0,
0 1 =10 = 0, and
a
1
= 0 when a is a nite rational number. We leave all
other cases undened. The need for 1 is slightly a nuisance, but the point
of it will be clear in a moment, and these technicalities are not serious.
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We can introduce a feasibility predicate F in much the same way as
before. Now we want to measure \rational" complexity, and we want to
take the eld structure into account. We give ourselves the obvious rules
for F , namely that 0 and 1 are feasible, that equality, sums, and products
preserve feasibility, and that additive and multiplicative inverses preserve
feasibility. There are some small caveats needed to account for the cases
when the operations are not dened, but let us not worry about that.
We have seen how the feasibility of large integers can be established
through short proofs, we can do the same now for rational numbers. This sug-
gests a very natural open problem: how can one relate the number-theoretic
properties of a rational number to the size of proofs of feasibility? Contin-
ued fraction expansions might be natural for this. Notice that we can get
short proofs of the feasibility of
2
m
3
n
and
2
m
+5
j
 12
3
n
+7
k
for large j; k;m, and n as
in Section 5. For proving feasibility the two are practically the same, but for
number theory they are quite dierent.
As for groups, the restriction to dierent fragments of logic can lead to
dierent number-theoretic properties, and one is free to choose the logical
system to suit one's purposes.
Let us describe now an amusing construction for feasibility of rational
numbers. The basic point is that 2 2 matrices with (nite) rational entries
act on rational numbers in a natural way. Let

a b
c d

be such a matrix, and
consider the transformation
x 7!
ax+ b
cx+ d
(7)
We assume that the determinant of our matrix is dierent from zero to avoid
problems with the denition. This condition ensures that the numerator and
the denominator above cannot both vanish at the same time, so that the
quotient is always dened. It is for this reason that we allow1 as a rational
number. If x =1 then we interpret the above quotient as being
a
c
. Not both
of a and c can vanish, because of the assumption of nonzero determinant.
Let A denote such a matrix

a b
c d

, and let A also denote the projective
linear transformation dened in (7). The correspondence from matrices to
projective transformations is a homomorphism, as is well known. Indeed, in
working with the rational numbers Q together with 1 we are really working
with the projective line over the rational numbers, which means the space of
ordinary lines in QQ. If  2 Q, then we associate to it the line that passes
through (1; ). This parameterizes all lines inQQ except for the one which
passes through (0; 1), which we associate to 1. A matrix A acts linearly on
Q Q and induces a transformation on the space of lines in Q Q. This
works out to be compatible with the mapping above.
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Let x be a rational number and consider A
n
x. We would like to have short
proofs of feasibility of A
n
x for large values of n. This ts with the earlier
construction for groups. Here we want to use instead the notion of feasibility
for the eld of rationals. We encode feasibility for the group of matrices into
the feasibility for the eld as follows. Given a 2  2 matrix A with nite
rational entries, let us write (A) for the formula F (a)^F (b)^F (c)^F (d).
This extension of feasibility is preserved by matrix multiplication, by an easy
argument.
This permits us to make short proofs of (A
n
) for large values of n as in
Section 6. For the argument in Section 5 based on nested quantiers there
are some subtleties. To understand the issue properly we should rst observe
that the constructions discussed here can be extended to elds in general. To
make the argument using nested quantiers we need to be able to quantify
over integers (which would arise in the exponents of our matrix). One can
do this if one can dene the integers inside the eld. For the rationals there
is a way to do this, due to Julia Robinson [37]. This would not work in a
eld of nite characteristic.
Once we have short proofs of (A
n
) for large n we can get short proofs
of the feasibility of A
n
x for large n, given the feasibility of x.
We chose this example in part because of the well-known importance of
projective transformations in analysis and number theory. Let us review
some aspects of complex analysis and its connection with rational numbers.
In analysis one works with complex numbers, both as matrix entries and for
the domain on which the projective transformations act. Instead of having
them act on the whole complex plane one often restricts oneself to actions
on the upper half-plane
fz 2 C : z = x+ iy; x; y 2 R; y > 0g:
A well known corollary of the uniformization theorem [1, 2] in complex anal-
ysis implies that most Riemann surfaces can be realized as the quotient of
the upper half-plane by a discrete group of projective linear transformations.
\Most" means all Riemann surfaces except the sphere, the plane, the plane
with one puncture, and tori.
These group actions on the upper half-plane induce group actions on the
boundary, the real line, which should be completed by the addition of a point
at innity. The action on the boundary can be much more chaotic than in
the interior, with the orbit of a point being dense instead of discrete.
Sometimes Riemann surfaces and the corresponding groups of projective
transformations have additional arithmetical structures. It can be natural to
look at the action of the groups on rational numbers.
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Here is a special case which provides an important example. Let SL(2;Z)
denote the group of 2  2 matrices with integer entries and determinant
1. This is indeed a group. The main point is that the inverses of such
matrices still have integer entries, because of the determinant. In fact it is
well known to be nitely generated with generators

0
1
 1
0

and

1
0
1
1

. (See
[31], p30, Theorem 1.) This group acts on the upper half-plane by projective
transformations, and the quotient that results is isomorphic as a Riemann
surface to the twice-punctured plane Cnf0; 1g.
For the purpose of making rational numbers which admit short proofs
of their feasibility we can extend the preceding construction. Because the
correspondence between matrices and projective transformations is a homo-
morphism, powers of projective transformations correspond to powers of ma-
trices, and we can work directly with square matrices of any rank. Suppose
that A is an mm matrix with rational entries. As before we can dene a
formula (A) which expresses the feasibility of the entries of A, and there is
a simple theorem to the eect that A B has feasible entries if A and B do.
This implies that we can make short proofs of the feasibility of matrices A
n
for large n. The entries of A
n
are rational numbers which have short proofs
of feasibility. Note however that the method of projective transformations
enjoys more structure than the case of matrices of arbitrary rank, dening a
group action on Q in particular.
We have described now some fast constructions of rational numbers, but
one can imagine plenty of others. Proofs provide a context for certain kinds
of dynamical behavior. Our extensions of the constructions in Section 5 work
whenever we have an action of the semigroup of nonnegative integers. The
precise nature of the dynamical behavior is not yet well understood, nor is
it properly reconciled with current knowledge of dynamical systems.
8 A story from topology
The examples so far illustrate how one might use the idea of feasibility to
make measurements and descriptions of mathematical constructions through
proofs. The examples all had a kind of discreteness to them, we would like to
be more ambitious now and point towards a more \continuous" setting. For
this we shall need to be even more relaxed than usual about formalization.
Certain ideas will emerge even if nothing is precise about the logic.
The concept of feasibility has a certain anity for continuity. One could
say that it wants to provide a kind of quantitative version of connectedness.
Our example from topology will take some time to explain and so we
describe some general points rst. We shall begin by reviewing the concept
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of Serre brations from topology [39, 3]. This notion entails the construc-
tion of continuous families of mappings for which the idea of feasibility is
potentially relevant. To bring out this point we shall discuss in some detail
a particular example of a torus bundle. In this special case the required con-
struction amounts to taking large powers of a matrix in SL(2;Z). The idea
of feasibility seems to be compatible with Serre brations in more general
situations, though, even if it does not reduce to groups as easily as in the
example of torus bundles over the circle. In the smooth case, for instance,
one can make constructions by solving ordinary dierential equations, which
can be seen as a generalization of taking large powers of a matrix.
Our example of a torus bundle captures geometrically a basic phenomenon
in proofs. Sometimes complicated constructions can be coded in short proofs
through repeated cycling and substitutions. A proof may describe a sim-
ple operation which is used repeatedly in the actual construction. In our
topological example we shall see that the simple motion of cycling around a
circle many times induces a motion up in our torus bundle with exponential
distortion.
Let us now proceed with the details. Let E and B be two topological
spaces, and let  : E ! B be a mapping between them. We say that
 : E ! B is a Serre bration if it enjoys the following property. Let
P be a nite polyhedron, and suppose that we have continuous mappings
f : P ! E and g : P  [0; 1] ! B such that   f = g(; 0). Then there
should be a \lifting"
b
g : P  [0; 1]! E of g, meaning a continuous mapping
with g =  
b
g, such that
b
g(; 0) = f . This is similar to the lifting of paths in
covering surfaces [2, 33], but now we are working with continuous families of
paths parameterized by the polyhedron P .
To understand what this means consider the simple case where E = BF
for some topological space F . (Here B is the \base" and F is the \ber".)
In this case the bration property is automatic, one can write down a
b
g
directly. (Take
b
g(p; x) = (g(p; x); 
1
(f(p))), where 
1
: E ! F is the obvious
projection onto F .) In general, topologists are more interested in situations
where E looks like a product above small subsets of the base B, but for which
there is nontrivial twisting around globally. In these cases one can often still
verify the existence of the necessary lifting. The point is to exhaust P  [0; 1]
through local liftings. For this one needs compactness assumptions to ensure
the niteness of the construction.
Serre brations are useful because one can relate the topology of the
total space E to the topology of the base B and the bers through an exact
sequence of homotopy groups. This is most interesting in the case where E
is not simply a product, so that there is nontrivial twisting.
Let us think of the lifting
b
g : P  [0; 1] ! E of g above as being like
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an explicit proof of feasibility. We start with an initial conguration which
is given by f : P ! E, and
b
g provides a way to get from f to a nal
conguration given by
b
g(; 1) in a continuous manner. In a discrete context
one would think of a sequence of very small steps. In practice there can be
a denite amount of distortion at each step, and then exponential distortion
over the whole time interval [0; 1]. See the gure below.
One can be interested in knowing how hard it is to nd this lifting, how
complicated the proof has to be for instance. This is not at all well dened
because we have not been precise about the formalization of logic in this case,
and it is not exactly clear what operations should be allowed. As a matter
of principle it does t well with our earlier examples, though, because there
are situations where the lifting is obtained by iterating a simple operation.
It is easier to think about this in the setting of compact smooth manifolds,
in which the construction can be made by solving an ordinary dierential
equation, which is a continuous version of iteration. (For this a technical
assumption on the mapping  is needed, which is that it be a submersion,
which means that its dierential is surjective everywhere.)
To make the ideas and the role of feasibility more clear let us consider a
concrete example of a bration with nontrivial twisting. Let S
1
denote the
unit circle. It will be more convenient to think of it as the quotient space
R=Z. Let T denote the torus S
1
 S
1
, which we can think of as R
2
=Z
2
.
We want to look at torus bundles over a circle. We shall use the following
recipe. Suppose that A : T ! T is a homeomorphism. Take [0; 1]  T and
glue the two ends f0g  T and f1g  T together using A. This means that
we take [0; 1]  T and we identify (0; u) with (1; A(u)) for all u 2 T . This
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denes a space which we call E. There is a natural mapping  : E ! S
1
which corresponds to the projection of [0; 1]T onto [0; 1], where we identify
S
1
with the space obtained by taking [0; 1] and identifying the endpoints 0
and 1.
We can describe this space in another way as follows. We start with
e
E = R  T . We dene a mapping  :
e
E !
e
E by (x; u) = (x + 1; A(u)).
This mapping generates an innite cyclic group of homeomorphisms on
e
E,
and E is just the quotient of
e
E by this group, in the same way that S
1
is the
quotient of R by the innite cyclic group of homeomorphisms generated by
x 7! x+ 1.
If instead of  we used the mapping (x; u) 7! (x+ 1; u) we would simply
get S
1
 T for the quotient. By choosing a suitable mapping A : T ! T we
can get a bundle in which there is some nontrivial twisting as we go around
the base.
Let us consider now a specic example of such a mapping A. Start with
the matrix

21
11

, which lies in SL(2;Z) since it has determinant 1. This
denes a linear mapping on R
2
. Because the matrix has integer entries the
corresponding linear mapping sends the standard integer lattice Z
2
insideR
2
to itself. Thus we can get a well-denedmapping on the quotientR
2
=Z
2
= T ,
and we take this to be A. This denes a homeomorphism on T , because the
inverse of

2 1
1 1

is also a matrix with integer entries (since the determinant is
1), and hence it descends to a mapping on T as well.
Thus we get a homeomorphism A : T ! T . It may seem harmless but in
fact it is quite nontrivial. It is not homotopic to the identity, for instance.
For if it were, its lifting to the universal covering of T would dier from
the identity by only a bounded amount, and this is not true. Indeed, R
2
is the universal covering of T , and the lifting of A to it is just the linear
transformation that we started with.
The rst homology and homotopy groups of T are isomorphic to each
other and to Z
2
. By general nonsense, the homeomorphism A induces an
automorphism on this group, which in this case is given by the action of the
matrix

2 1
1 1

with which we began. This provides a topological way to measure
the dierence between A and the identity mapping, even up to homotopy.
To understand better the nontrivial eect of A it is helpful to compute
the eigenvalues of our matrix. These are the roots of the polynomial
det(
 
2 1
1 1
!
  I) = (2   )(1   )   1 = ( 
3
2
)
2
 
5
4
;
namely  =
3
p
5
2
. Note that the product of these numbers is 1, as it should
be, and one is larger than 1 and the other is smaller than 1. In fact the larger
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eigenvalue is between 2 and 3.
Because our matrix is symmetric we can nd an orthogonal basis with
respect to which it is diagonal with these two eigenvalues. When we take large
powers of the matrix we get exponential compression in one direction and
exponential expansion in the other. Topologically this exponential expansion
for the matrix implies that we can nd loops in the torus T whose image in
T under A
n
wraps around an exponentially larger number of times. This
wrapping is depicted by the diagonal lines in the gure below, where the
torus is obtained from the square by identifying the opposite sides. The
diagonal lines represent a single curve in the torus.
Thus A is quite nontrivial and this leads to nontrivial twisting of the
bration E. We want to see how this twisting is reected in liftings (as for
Serre brations). Suppose that f : P ! E is some continuous mapping,
where P is a nite polyhedron. One can think of P as being a polygonal
circle. Let us assume that the image of f lies in a single ber of E, so that
there is a point b 2 S
1
such that the image of f lies in 
 1
(b). Let us assume
also that our mapping g is of a particularly simple form, that it is constant
on P . Thus g is in essence a mapping from [0; 1] into S
1
, which we denote
by  since it is technically a separate object. Note that (0) = b, because
of the compatibility between g and f . In this situation our lifting problem
becomes that of nding a mapping f
1
: P  [0; 1]! E which is an extension
of f in the sense that f
1
(p; 0) = f(p) for all p 2 P and whose projection to
the base is essentially  in the sense that (f
1
(p; x)) = (x) for all x 2 [0; 1]
and all p 2 P .
In other words, f maps P into a single ber of E, and f
1
(; x) maps into
the ber in E over (x). As x ranges through [0; 1] these bers can move,
but we can also return to the same ber when  contains loops.
Let us explain how we can obtain how we can nd such a lifting f
1
(p; x).
If E were just the product S
1
 T then we could pull f along the param-
eter interval rigidly. Because of the twisting of our bundle we have to do
something stronger, and it is convenient to go back to
e
E = R  T . Let
e
 : [0; 1] ! R be a continuous mapping which projects back to  under the
canonical mapping from R to R=Z = S
1
. This lifting
e
 of  is determined
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uniquely by its initial point
e
b =
e
(0), which is a lifting of b (but otherwise
arbitrary). Our quotient mapping from
e
E onto E is a homeomorphism on
each of the bers, and so there is a mapping
e
f : P !
e
E which actually takes
values in f
e
bgT and which projects back down to f when we project
e
E onto
E using our quotient mapping.
In short, we can lift everything upstairs to
e
E. Since
e
E is just a product
we can dene a mapping
e
f
1
: P  [0; 1]!
e
E in the obvious way, by setting
e
f
1
(p; x) = (
e
(x);
e

1
(
e
f(p)));
where
e

1
:
e
E ! T is the obvious projection. Thus up in
e
E we are doing
something quite trivial, we are simply sliding
e
f along R rigidly.
Now we dene f
1
: P  [0; 1] ! E to simply be the composition of
e
f
1
: P  [0; 1] !
e
E with the quotient mapping from
e
E onto E. It is easy
to see that this choice of f
1
has the desired properties, namely that it is a
continuous mapping which agrees with f at the beginning and follows  in
the base for the whole time interval [0; 1].
Now let us look at how f
1
(p; x) is distorted as x runs from 0 to 1. Imagine
that  moves at constant speed in S
1
but very fast, so that it wraps around
S
1
many times. An integer number of times, n times say, moving in the
positive orientation and ending back at b. Then the lifting
e
 of  moves
along at constant speed in R, it starts at
e
b and ends at
e
b+ n.
So what does f
1
(; 1) look like when we go around the circle n times? It
looks like f
1
(; 0) = f acted on by A
n
! That is, f
1
(; 1) and f both map P
into the ber 
 1
(b) in E, which is a copy of T . If we move the mappings
back into T so that we can look at them, then the transition from time 0 to
time 1 is given by A
n
. This is because each tour around S
1
corresponds to
an application of A on T . This follows from chasing denitions.
From our earlier analysis of A (just before the second gure) we conclude
that our mapping f
1
may undergo exponential stretching as we traverse the
parameter interval [0; 1]. This is unavoidable and not simply an artifact of our
construction. For instance, suppose that our initial mapping f represents a
loop in T (i.e., P is a circle). The ending mapping f
1
(; 1) represents another
loop in T . No matter how we choose f
1
the homotopy class of our nal
loop in T has to be the same as the one obtained from the construction
above. Therefore the amount of winding that the nal loop makes in terms
of topology is simply determined by A
n
, and can be exponentially large, as
we have seen.
This nishes our concrete construction. Let us think about what it means.
We are interested in feasibility for mappings into our space E. We might call
such a mapping feasible if it is quite simple (e.g., if it does not wrap around
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too much), or if it can be obtained from a feasible mapping by a small
perturbation. Thus feasibility is like being homotopic to something simple.
One can then try to nd complicated objects which are feasible with a short
proof, and our construction of the lifting suggests an example of this.
Despite the diculties of formalization this is certainly a situation worth
considering. The problem of making liftings for brations is quite basic in
topology. If one wants to try to come to terms with constructions in topology
from the perspective of complexity of proofs it provides a good place to start.
9 Feasibility and continuous parameters
One might argue that the preceding example does not really mean anything,
that the kinds of compression that we saw in earlier sections lose their sense
in this continuous context. There is nothing wrong with that, it is basic
issue to be understood. A point about our example is to see such issues in a
context which is both fairly realistic in terms of ordinary mathematics and
with enough structure for an idea like feasibility to be relevant.
A basic underlying problem, then, is this. Consider the idea of feasibil-
ity in an algebraic context, in terms of taking B
n
for large n where B is a
matrix, say. In ordinary mathematics we are often allowed to pass to con-
tinuous constructions and take B
t
where t is a real number. One can do
this with matrices (positive denite matrices, for instance), and one is doing
something very similar in solving an ordinary dierential equation. Does
anything remain in the idea of short proofs of feasibility in these situations?
One answer is simply \no". Consider the dierential equation y
0
= y
which is solved by the exponential function. One can view this dierential
equation as a continuous version of recursion and the existence of its solution
as a consequence of a \continuous" version of induction. (One can think of
this as being analogous to proving by induction in arithmetic that exponen-
tial functions are dened everywhere.) For the notion of feasibility, it was
important not to allow induction over F -formulas to avoid collapsing into
triviality. A theory which provides the existence of exponential functions
with continuous parameters, or solutions of dierential equations, might ar-
guably be too powerful to permit a meaningful notion of feasibility.
In ordinary mathematics one typically denes exponentials by summing
innite series, and one can nd solutions of ordinary dierential equations
through approximation schemes which converge well. These constructions
do not seem to be compatible with the short proofs of feasibility of numbers
though. The short proofs try to operate from the \inside", speeding up the
procedure by which we operate step by step, while the aforementioned con-
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structions of the exponential function and solutions of ordinary dierential
equations are more global in nature, dealing with a continuum of points at
once.
One can try to make more \inner" denitions, such as
e

= lim
n!1
(1 +

n
)
n
for the exponential, and realizing solutions of ordinary dierential equations
as limits of discrete dierence equations. For theoretical purposes these ap-
proaches are awkward, in large part because one must establish the existence
of the limit. This is easier to do when one has the existence of the exponen-
tial or the solution to the dierential equation established already by other
means.
What about the topological example? In many situations one can treat
it by solving an ordinary dierential equation. On the other hand there is an
extra discreteness to it. One does not need to know that the required family
of mappings satises a dierential equation but only that it exists and is
continuous. Under reasonable conditions one does not even need a continuous
family, one could replace the parameter interval [0; 1] with a discrete set so
long as the family that is constructed is \approximately" continuous, in the
sense that each new step is a suciently small perturbation of the preceding
one. One can then ll in the gaps automatically to get a continuous family
parameterized by [0; 1].
Roughly speaking one could say that for topology (1 +

n
)
n
is often prac-
tically as good as e

when n is large enough but still nite. This can allow
the idea of feasibility to retain its relevance, perhaps in a more limited form.
One has to be careful about what kind of operations are allowed.
Of course one is not prevented from making other notions of feasibility for
approximating classical constructions in analysis (such as summing a series
for the exponential function, or approximation schemes for nding solutions
of ordinary dierential equations). For this type of construction one typically
deals with eciency of approximation rather than exact values, as in the
earlier and more algebraic examples. In topology a good approximation is
often good enough already.
10 Remarks about compression and cuts
We have tried to explore some examples of natural notions of \feasibility",
where there can be short proofs.
What does \short" really mean? In the examples there was some clear
sense that the proofs were short compared to what one might expect, given
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the complexity of the particular object in question. But can we dene \short"
more abstractly, more invariantly, more objectively?
There is an obvious answer to this, in terms of the cut rule in sequent
calculus. The reader who is unfamiliar with this may wish to consult [10]
for an introduction to the cut rule and the combinatorics and complexity
of cut elimination. The main point is that these short proofs all use cuts,
and a natural way to measure the \shortness" is to ask how large a proof
would have to be without the cut rule. We would then consider the relative
sizes between proofs with and without cuts rather than the absolute sizes of
proofs.
In many contexts in logic one can show that it is possible to eliminate
cuts from a proof, but at great cost of expansion. See [18, 19, 21, 45]. There
are examples known where the smallest proof without cuts is much larger
than the smallest proof with cuts [46, 34, 35, 41, 42, 43, 27, 4]. The present
discussion suggests that we view this phenomenon as a reection of some
kind of internal symmetry or structure. One can imagine results to the eect
that there is much less to gain in the size of proofs using cuts in situations
where the internal structure is not cooperative. In particular one might nd
that the gain is often not too dramatic. These issues are related to the \P
= NP?" problem [14, 17, 28].
This may seem to be at odds with the normal experience of mathemati-
cians, but then one has to face the issue that the situations that mathe-
maticians can deal with are typically very special and enjoy a lot of internal
structure.
Random objects cannot have short descriptions [30, 32, 11, 12]. This is
well known and much-studied, although the basic point is clear by counting.
The question then is whether certain types of descriptions are often much
more ecient than others. In some contexts one knows that this is not the
case, that the upper bounds on the best algorithmic description is about the
same as the average. For formal proofs the general picture remains unclear.
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